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In this article, we investigate the relevance of the glass ceiling hypothesis in
France, according to which there exist larger gender wage gaps at the upper
tail of the wage distribution. Using a matched worker-firm data set of
about 1 30 000 employees and 14 000 employers, we estimate quantile
regressions and rely on a principal component analysis to summarize
information specific to the firms. Our different results show that
accounting for firm-related characteristics reduces the gender earnings
gap at the top of the distribution, but the latter still remains much higher at
the top than at the bottom. Furthermore, a quantile decomposition shows
that the gender wage gap is mainly due to differences in the returns to
observed characteristics rather than in differences in characteristics
between men and women.
I. Introduction
The persistence of wage differentials between men
and women with identical productive characteristics
is an important stylized fact of labour markets in
both industrialized and developing countries.
Evidence of a gender wage gap in pay is indeed
abundant. Wage differentials across genders that are
not compensated by observed socio-economic char-
acteristics were found on numerous occasions in
empirical studies (for instance, see the review in Blau
and Kahn, 2000). Many models have attempted to
give a theoretical interpretation to these gender pay
gaps. Traditionally, economists have focused on
either qualifications or labour market treatment of
similarly qualified individuals.1 Other theories like
the insider–outsider or the efficiency wage models
have stressed noncompetitive mechanisms of wage
determination.
More recently, it has been suggested that there exist
larger gender wage gaps at the upper tail of the wage
distribution, so that it concerns in most cases the
*Corresponding author. E-mail: nordman@dial.prd.fr
1 The former, within the competitive framework, emphasize the existence of compensating wages due, for instance, to
differences in human capital accumulation across gender. Because women anticipate shorter and more discontinuous work
lives, they have lower incentives to invest in market-oriented formal education and on-the-job training, and their resulting
smaller human capital investments will lower their earnings relative to those of men.
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more skilled workers. This is the so-called glass
ceiling effect above women in the labour market,
which can be defined as an invisible barrier that
inhibits promotion opportunities for women, but not
for men, and prevents them from reaching top
positions. Several papers have empirically shed light
on the magnitude of the glass ceiling effect in
different European countries.2
For instance, using data collected in 1998 in
Sweden, Albrecht et al. (2003) show that the gender
wage gap is increasing throughout the conditional
wage distribution and accelerating at the top, and
they interpret this result as evidence of a glass ceiling
in Sweden. Using data for Spain, De la Rica et al.
(2005) stratify their sample by education group and
find that the gender wage gap is expanding over the
wage distribution only for the group with tertiary
education. For less educated groups, the gender wage
gap is wider at the bottom than the top. This means
that, in Spain, there is a glass ceiling for the more
educated, while for the less educated there is not.
Using the European Community Household Panel
data set, Arulampalam et al. (2004) find that for most
of their 10 EU countries, in both the public and
private sectors, the average gender wage gap can be
broken up into a gap that is typically wider at the top
and occasionally also wider at the bottom of the
conditional wage distribution. They interpret the
gender wage gap at the top of the wage distribution
as a glass ceiling evidence, whereby women otherwise
identical to men can only advance so far up the pay
ladder. At the bottom of the wage distribution in
some of their EU countries, they also find that the
gender pay gap widens significantly and define this
phenomenon as a sticky floor (see also Booth et al.,
2003; Ichino and Filippin, 2005).
Surprisingly, to date, there is no clear theoretical
argument to rationalize the glass ceiling effect among
the various usual existing explanations for the gender
wage gap. According to the Beckerian theory,
discrimination is due to the discriminatory tastes of
employers, co-workers or customers. Alternatively, in
models of statistical discrimination, differences in the
treatment of men and women arise from average
differences between the two groups in the expected
value of productivity or in the reliability with which
productivity may be predicted, which lead employers
to discriminate on the basis of that average.
Discriminatory exclusion of women from ‘male’
jobs can also result in an excess supply of labour in
‘female’ occupations, depressing wages there for
otherwise equally productive workers. But in these
various approaches, there is no reason to expect
larger gaps at the upper tail of the wage distribution.
De la Rica et al. (2005) suggest that a dead-end
argument operate in the upper tail of the distribu-
tion.3 Women are less frequently promoted because
their jobs can less easily be promoted. Employees are
most often reluctant to invest in women’s training,
for instance, because women have more favourable
outside opportunities than men within the household.
Jellal et al. (2006) introduce uncertainty on the female
productivity in a competitive labour market model.
Women are likely to have more frequently inter-
rupted careers (because of birth event for instance),
and they may choose to quit the labour force either to
spend time with children or to care for elderly
parents. Owing to this uncertainty, firms pass the
risk of variability in women’s production on female
wages and the negative risk premium increases as
women are more qualified.
In this article, we wonder whether it matters to
control for firms’ characteristics when estimating the
gender wage gap along the wage distribution. Our
contribution is thus mainly empirical, as we do not
propose any economic hypotheses related to firm
characteristics. This is undoubtedly a shortcoming of
the present analysis, but the difficulty is that several
explanations may be invoked to rationalize the glass
ceiling effect. Furthermore, it may be excessively
difficult to assess the relevance of these hypotheses.4
Thus, our article may be seen as a first step in the
inclusion of firms’ characteristics in the gender wage
gap and glass ceiling literature, with a focus on
empirical assessment. The next step would be
naturally to further investigate the influence of these
firms’ factors in order to get a comprehensive
understanding on the glass ceiling effect.
So, we primarily assess the relevance of the glass
ceiling hypothesis using matched worker-firm data
collected in 1992 in France. Although differences in
productivity across workers could stem from their
2 Conversely, evidence on gender-earnings differentials in less developed countries remains scarce. See for instance Sakellariou
(2004) for quantile wage regressions in the Philippines, Hinks (2002) in South Africa or Nielsen (2000) in Zambia.
3 Conversely, since high-educated women have participation rates which are only slightly lower than male participation rates,
women’s and men’s wages should not be very different in the lower part of the income distribution (De la Rica et al., 2005).
4 This is the case for instance for the uncertainty argument suggested by Jellal et al. (2006). The French data provides very
poor proxy on the measure of uncertainty. Also, finding some results in favour of the uncertainty argument does not preclude
that the motivation for the glass ceiling effect is due to other arguments not specifically related to uncertainty considerations.
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differences in human capital, it is well acknowledged
that some skills or human capital attributed to
workers are also specific to the firms in which those
workers operate. Thus, part of the returns to human
capital for the worker remuneration can be viewed as
originating from the firm (Abowd et al., 1999).5
Hence, not controlling for firm specific effects on
individual earnings differentials may lead to biased
estimates when focusing on returns to human capital
by gender. Curiously, firm specific effects have been
neglected so far in the analysis of gender earnings
gap, Bayard et al. (2003) and Meng (2004) being
worthwhile exceptions.
As a consequence, the gender wage gap at the
upper tail of the wage distribution may be wrongly
overstated if firms reward highly educated women
differently than men. Thus, our main contribution is
to propose for the first time an empirical investigation
of the glass ceiling effect in a context where specific
firm effects are controlled for. Following previous
studies, we first use quantile regressions techniques to
assess the extent to which the glass ceiling phenom-
enon exists in France. Then, we control for firms’
specific wage policies by introducing the firms’
features into the different earnings functions. A
novelty of our approach is to perform quantile
regressions using a preliminary principal component
analysis of firms’ characteristics, as in Muller and
Nordman (2004, 2006). We also carry out a quantile
decomposition analysis with the inclusion of firms’
factors. We follow the method of Machado and Mata
(2005) and examine whether gender wage differences
stem from differentiated returns to observable
characteristics.
In France, we find that introducing firm-related
characteristics into earnings equation significantly
reduces the gender earnings gap at the top of the
distribution. However, the gender wage gap still
remains greater at the top than at the bottom as in
other European countries. The rest of this article is
organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the
French ECMOSS survey conducted in 1992 by
INSEE. In Section III, we present the econometric
methodology and our strategy to account for firm
related characteristics. We discuss in Section IV the
different results of the quantile regressions along with
results from the quantile decomposition. Section V
concludes.
II. The French Matched Worker-Firm Data
The data we use in this article are drawn from a
unique French survey which matches information of
both employers and employees, the 1992 INSEE
survey on labour cost and wage structure (Enqueˆtes
sur le Couˆt de la Main-d’Oeuvre et la Structure des
Salaires en 1992, ECMOSS thereafter). It is well-
known that such data sets allow the structure of
wages to be modelled while controlling for firm-
specific effects (Abowd and Kramarz 1999).
Specifically, the French survey contains information
on 1 50 000 different workers across 16 000 different
workplaces.6 The sampling population covered by
these data is very broad, as all establishments are
covered independently of their size and in all
industries apart from agriculture, fisheries, nontraded
services and central and local government.
The ECMOSS survey contains a great deal of
information. Concerning the employees, data are
available on workers’ gross annual wage, which is
broken down into fixed salary, bonuses, overtime,
and data on their gender, age, nationality, tenure,
occupation, education level and number of paid
hours. There is also some detailed information on
the employer, including main economic activity, size,
geographical location, management style, work orga-
nization and salary policy. In order to perform our
econometric analysis, several additional variables
have been constructed and we describe them below.
Concerning the workers, we determine the total
number of years of education calculated from the
final level reached, total potential experience in the
labour market which is given by age minus number of
years of education minus 6, hourly earnings (gross
salary plus payments in kind, all divided by the
number of paid hours over the year), and the average
number of paid hours of training per worker in the
establishment (the number of hours of paid training
by worker by occupational category – executive or
5 It is also possible that part of what could be interpreted as human capital externalities in the estimates is in fact a
consequence of the selection of workers by firms and vice versa. For instance, highly educated workers (i.e. high wage
workers) are more likely to match with high wage firms (Abowd et al., 1999).
6 This labour cost survey is concurrently carried out in all European Union countries every 4 years and aims at providing
comparable labour market statistics across EU countries. In the 1992 wave of this survey, INSEE matched the data with those
on the wage structure. For previous studies which have estimated earnings functions on the same data, see among others
Abowd et al. (2001), Destre´ and Nordman (2002), Destre´ (2003) and Meng and Meurs (2004).
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nonexecutive – divided by the total number of
workers by occupational category).7
By definition, we have only information on persons
having a paid job in the French matched data set.
This is undoubtedly a shortcoming as we are unable
to account for gender differences in the labour force
participation. It is well-known that women have a
lower probability to take part in the labour market,
which raises some selectivity issue. Albeit the
expected positive self-selection for women that may
affect the magnitude of the gender wage gap, the
problem is certainly not too severe. The selection
issue has been recently addressed within a quantile
decomposition framework by Albrecht et al. (2006).
In the Netherlands, these authors evidence a positive
self-selection of women into full-time work, but still
find that the bulk of the gender wage gap is due to
differences between men and women in the return to
individual characteristics.
In the same way, again owing to data limitation, we
focus on workers currently employed in the private
sector. Again, this restriction leads to a selection bias
as women tend to be present more in the public
sector. Nevertheless, in the French context, the
problem is certainly less severe than it seems owing
to the fact that in the public sector, wages are mainly
fixed by law and then cannot really respond to
productivity or discrimination strategies. After delet-
ing observations with missing values or outliers, the
worker sample amounts to 1 37 211 individuals
divided into 14 693 establishments. Table 1 provides
a description of the characteristics of the employees.
To test the glass ceiling hypothesis, one novelty of
our approach is to control for firm level variables in
the analysis of wage determination. We describe
below the information that is utilized for a prelimin-
ary multivariate analysis of firm-related character-
istics. The definitions and descriptive statistics of
these variables appear in Table A1 of the Appendix.
First, we make use of 12 sectoral dummies (S1, S2,
S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, S10, S11, S12), the size of the
establishments (A4),8 and four dummies for the
average number of paid hours of training per
worker in the establishment (in increasing order,
FF1, FF2, FF3, FF4).The following variables relate to
qualitative aspects of firms’ activity: dummies
describing the intensity of business the past 5 years
(‘strongly growing’ or ‘growing’: VA1, ‘stable’: VA2;
‘strongly decreasing’ or ‘decreasing’: VA3), whether
activity is usually affected by seasonal movements
(D21), whether it is rather regular (D31) or irregular
(D32), whether firms have been affected by unusual
shocks in 1992 (D4A1) and, if it is the case, whether it
was a downturn (D4B1) or an upturn (D4B2). We also
make use of qualitative features of intra-firm wage
determination such as dummies for the presence of
union representatives (PS1), for the existence of wage
negotiations in 1992 (D151), and for the use of a
formal wage scale system for blue collar workers’
wage base (D19A1). If such a formal system is used,
Table 1. Description of the workers’ characteristics
Main sample characteristics Mean [Min; Max] SD
Number of observed employees per establishment 18.99 [2; 152] 15.53
Sex (1 for men, 0 otherwise) 0.60
Age 37.68 [16.25; 65] 10.30
Nationality (1 if French, 0 otherwise) 0.93
Hourly earnings (gross wage plus payments in kind, all
divided by the number of paid hours over the year)
69.48 [29.00;395.83] 39.49
Education (number of completed years of schooling) 12.77 [8; 18] 1.65
Potential previous experience (Number of years of labour
market experience: age–tenure – education – 6)
9.27 [0; 48.91] 8.72
Tenure in the current establishment (number of years of tenure) 9.71 [0; 46.5] 8.84
Executives (1 if executive, 0 otherwise) 0.11
Number of hours paid work per year 1671.78 [33; 2310] 585.46
Type of contract (1 if fixed duration contract, 0 otherwise) 0.08
Workplace (1 if Paris, 0 otherwise) 0.19
Source: Survey INSEE ECMOSS 1992.
Note: The size of the sample is 1 37 211 employees, working in 14 693 establishments.
7 The education variable is constructed as follows. For a sub-sample of more than 8000 workers for whom the number of years
of education is available (besides the highest paper certificate), we calculate the median number of years of education for each
qualification considered. This indirect method for calculating the length of education has the advantage of partially removing
the endogeneity of the education variable (see the discussion in Destre´, 2003).
8 For the econometric analysis, dummies are also defined as follows: less than 20 employees (T1), 20–49 (T2), 50–99 (T3),
100–199 (T4), 200–499 (T5) and more than 500 employees (T6).
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the questionnaire provides further information as to
whether it is based on the branch’s collective
agreement (D19B1), on the firm’s collective agreement
(D19B2) or on another evaluation scheme (evaluation
of posts, D19B3).
Further detailed information describes the impor-
tance accorded by employers to different criteria in
individual wage increases (for both blue collar and
white collar workers). In the questionnaire, the
answers were ranked according to three different
levels of importance: ‘none’, ‘weak’, ‘medium’ and
‘very strong’. In our analysis, we make use of
dummies taking into account the answers ‘very
strong’: workers’ tenure in the job (D3513), increase
in workers’ performance (D3523), workers’ training
effort (D3533), accumulation of experience (D3543),
acquisition of versatility (D3553), increase in workers’
responsibilities (D3563), intra-firm mobility (D3573)
and difficulty of workers’ eventual replacement
(D3583).
Qualitative variables are then used to describe the
extent to which employers favour individual or
general wage increases in their wage policy: whether
the base wage progressions ‘exclusively’ (D331),
‘principally’ (D332), ‘little’ (D333) or ‘never’ (D334)
depend on individual increases and on general
increases (respectively, D341, D342, D343, D344).
Dummies regarding individual bonuses according to
performances are also introduced in the following
way: D3911 indicates whether firms give relative
bonuses (the best workers are awarded), D3921
describes whether bonuses are of ‘absolute’ type
(the production standards are exceeded). If these
two schemes exist in the same firm, D39B1 reports
which one is the most important (equals to one if it is
relative bonuses). Finally, D411 signals firms having
implemented an explicit wage policy characterized by
precise objectives.
Firms’ organizational features are likely to influ-
ence employers’ wage settings as well as skill diffusion
and acquisition processes (Lindbeck and Snower,
2000; Caroli et al., 2001; Greenan, 2003). We
construct dummies describing the firm’s hierarchical
structure such as the number of intermediate levels of
management between the firm’s manager and the blue
collar workers assigned to productive lines (zero
levels: D250; from 1 to 4: D251; from 5 to 10: D252; 11
levels and above: D253), dummies indicating the
existence of job rotation schemes and how they are
implemented (whether they are put into practice
within production teams: D26A1, and whether they
are intended to some versatile workers independently
from team working: D26B1), a dummy when direct
collaborations between employees of different depart-
ments are encouraged (D281), a dummy reporting
whether achieved work is ‘permanently’ controlled
rather than ‘intermittently’ or ‘occasionally’ (D301), a
dummy signalling whether individual performances
are ‘systematically’ controlled rather than ‘occasion-
ally’ or ‘never’ (D311), and a dummy for the existence
of a formal system to measure individual perfor-
mances (D321).
III. Econometric Strategy
Quantile regression and least absolute deviation
estimators are now popular estimation methods
(Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Buchinsky, 1998). This
technique can be interpreted as using the error
distribution in the earnings equation for the definition
of different earnings categories, i.e. quantiles, instead
of the observed earnings differentials. The popularity
of these methods relies on three sets of properties.
First, they provide robust estimates, particularly
for misspecification errors related to non-normality
and heteroskedasticity, but also for the presence of
outliers due to data contamination. Second, they
allow the researcher to focus on specific parts of the
distribution of interest, which is the conditional
distribution of the dependent variable, and to
estimate the marginal effect of a covariate on log
earnings at various points in the distribution. So,
quantile regressions allow estimating the effect of
gender, education or experience on log earnings at the
bottom of the log earnings distribution, at the
median, and at the top of the distribution. Third,
quantile regressions are appropriate when earnings
functions contribute only to a small part of the
variance of earnings, so that the distribution of
earnings and the distribution of errors are close.9
Let us briefly describe the underlying econometric
specification. We denote by wij the log earnings of
individual i working in firm j, and xij a vector of
explanatory variables excluding gender. We define fij
as a dummy variable being equal to one when the
employee is a woman, and equal to zero otherwise.
Under the assumption of a linear specification, the
model that we seek to estimate is given by:
qðwij xij

 Þ ¼ x0ijðÞ þ fijðÞ ð1Þ
9 In our empirical analysis, we rely on bootstrap confidence intervals for quantile regressions in order to avoid the
consequences of the slow convergence of classical confidence intervals of estimates (Hahn, 1995). However, given the large
size of our sample, the results are only marginally modified.
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where qðwij xij

 Þ is the th conditional quantile of wi j.
In a quantile regression, the distribution of the error
term is left unspecified (Koenker and Bassett, 1978).
In (1), the set of coefficients ðÞ provides the
estimated rates of return to the covariates at the th
quantile of the log earnings distribution, and the
coefficient ðÞ measures the intercept shift due to
gender differences. Two comments are in order.
First, we begin by estimating the magnitude of the
gender earnings gap on the whole sample which
includes both male and female employees. However,
when pooling the data, we implicitly assume that the
returns to the labour market characteristics are the
same at various quantiles for men and women. As
this assumption is not necessarily satisfied, we will
relax it latter on.
Second, the ECMOSS survey allows the structure
of wages to be modelled while controlling firm-
specific effects. With our matched data, we can deal
with the firm heterogeneity by introducing firm
characteristics into the earnings equation.
Nevertheless, a difficulty is that we cannot model
unobserved individual heterogeneity in the way of
Abowd et al. (1999) as this is a cross-sectional data
set. In order to temper the effect of firm hetero-
geneity, the natural attempt is to estimate firm fixed
effects models including firm-specific dummies.
Nevertheless, this technique seems to be futile in
our case. Indeed, as we estimate quantile regressions,
the large number of establishments (more than 10
000) rules out the possibility of doing this.10
An alternative approach is developed in Muller and
Nordman (2004, 2006). It consists of summarizing the
main information on the firms’ characteristics using a
multivariate analysis and introducing the computed
principal components (factors) stemming from this
analysis into the earnings functions. Using factors
may be seen as a further step with respect to those
studies which have added mean firm variables into
earnings functions, individual characteristics being
controlled for. By contrast with firms’ fixed effects
that are introduced in wage regressions, the principal
factors suggest qualitative characteristics of the firms.
Specifically, we use a principal component analysis
(PCA) to summarize the information about the
surveyed establishments.11
This method is based on the calculation of the
inertia axes for a cloud of points that represents
the data in table format. There are different possible
uses of factor analysis in this context. First, factor
analyses can be used to elicit hidden characteristics
correlated with observable characteristics. Second,
PCA results could be used as a guide to replace these
hidden firm characteristics with observable character-
istics correlated with the main factors (as in Muller
and Nordman, 2004). Third, and foremost in our
case, the PCA is used as a substitute for firm fixed
effect regressions. Indeed, the PCA allows us to
investigate the determinants of the firm effects
in our data. As long as the computed factors account
for most of the firm heterogeneity bias, this
approach allows us to obtain consistent estimates of
the returns to worker characteristics and of the
gender wage gap.
For our purpose, the first 10 inertia axes (the
estimated factors which are linear components of all
the firm’s characteristics described in the previous
section) concentrate a large proportion of the total
variance of the original variables (about 40%) and
reflect, therefore, a fair amount of the relevant
information about the firm’s characteristics. The
correlation coefficients of the firms’ characteristics
with the first 10 factors are used for the interpretation
of the computed factors. The other factors represent a
negligible amount of the statistical information and
are dropped from the analysis.
Further details on this rotated PCA can be found
in Muller and Nordman (2006) and obtained from
the authors upon request. Let us note that the 10
factors are closely associated with the firms’ sectoral
belonging (factor 1), the various criteria used by
employers for defining their implemented wage policy
(factors 2, 4 and 9), their organizational features
(hierarchical structure and supervision; factors 3, 6
and 7) and the firms’ general features such as the state
of business in 1992 (factors 5 and 10) and the firm size
and training capacity (factor 8). The 10 factors
therefore reflect a wide range of firm characteristics
and account for the existence of very different types
of firms in the French private sector in 1992.
These firms can mainly be described by their sector
affiliation, size, organizational features (including
firm wage policy) and human capital density.
We are now ready to comment on our econometric
analysis.
10However, very recently, Koenker (2005) has proposed a new advanced method which allows estimating fixed effects
quantile regressions with a large number of fixed effects, but the estimation is far from being straightforward.
11 In principal component analysis, a set of variables is transformed into orthogonal components, which are linear
combinations of the variables and have maximum variance subject to being uncorrelated with one another. Typically, the first
few components account for a large proportion of the total variance of the original variables, and hence can be used to
summarize the original data. The computed factors were rotated using an oblique rotation. As in Muller and Nordman
(2006), we have tried many other techniques of factor analysis, which all lead to similar conclusions.
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IV. Econometric Results
Quantile regressions estimates
Under the assumption that the returns to included
labour market characteristics are the same for the two
genders, the gender dummies in the quantile regres-
sions are interpreted as the effects of gender on log
earnings at the various percentiles once one controls
for any differences in these labour market character-
istics between genders. Estimates for the gender
coefficient on the pooled dataset are reported in
Table 2 for various specifications, the full set of
estimates being reported in Table 3.12
The first row presents a series of quantile regres-
sions in which we condition the log earnings on
gender at the 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, and
95th percentiles, without any control variable.13 We
notice that the observed log earnings gap increases as
we move up the earnings distribution, with a sharp
acceleration after the 75th percentile. For instance, at
the 75th percentile, we see a raw gender earnings gap
of slightly less than 25%. This means that the log
earnings of a man at the 75th percentile of the male
earnings distribution is a bit more than 22 points
above the log earnings of a woman at the 75th
percentile of the female earnings distribution.
Interestingly, very similar patterns have emerged in
other European countries. First, male and female
earnings are closer at the bottom of the earnings
distribution. Second, male and female earnings are
extremely unequal at the top of the distribution, up to
a maximum difference of about 50%. Third, there is a
steady increase in the gender log earnings gap as we
move up in the earnings distribution. Fourth, there is
a sharp acceleration in the increase in the gender log
earnings gap starting at about the 75th or 80th
percentile in the earnings distribution. Following
Albrecht et al. (2003), De la Rica et al. (2005) or
Arulampalam et al. (2004), we interpret this last
feature of the gender log earnings gap by percentile as
evidence of a glass ceiling.
Then, we examine various quantile estimates of the
gender dummy coefficients when adding both male
and female’s labour market characteristics. Several
specifications have been considered, the list of
explanatory variables being further described in
Table 2. In what follows, we only focus on the
gender dummy coefficient which indicates the extent
to which the gender earnings gap remains
unexplained at the different quantiles after control-
ling for individual differences in various combina-
tions of characteristics. We begin by introducing into
the earnings equations the covariates commonly used
in labour economics, i.e. education, potential experi-
ence, tenure, dummies for the matrimonial status,
nationality and the number of dependent children.
Then, we add job-specific variables such as the type
of work contract, the workplace, the number of hours
worked per year, sector of employment and
occupation.
When we control for education, experience off the
current job, firm tenure, and other basic socio-
economic characteristics (panel 2, Table 2), the
gender dummies increase in absolute value relative
to the raw gender dummy at the 5th and the 10th
percentile, but then decrease from about the 20th
through the 95th percentiles. The OLS gender dummy
coefficient (at the mean) also diminishes. One
explanation could be that in the first quartile of the
log hourly earnings distribution, women display more
labour market experience than men while this is not
the case as for workers belonging to the second, third
and fourth quartiles.
In the panel 3 of Table 2, we introduce the
extended control variables which include basic con-
trol variables plus the type of work contract, the log
of hours paid per year, and the location of the firm.
The quantile estimates indicate that the gender
dummy decreases in absolute value from the 5th to
the median percentile as compared to the preceding
model. Then, from about the 75th to the 95th,
however, the gender dummy increases. This might be
a first indication that job-related characteristics
(working conditions) do matter in explaining why
the earnings gap is much greater at the upper tail of
the earnings distribution.14
We next present the estimated gender dummy
coefficients after adding 12 sectoral dummies in the
quantile regressions (panel 4). The same picture
emerges from these estimates, and the gender
dummy is reduced only minimally at the bottom of
the earnings distribution and slightly increases from
about the 20th percentile and more substantially at
the top of the earnings distribution. Of course, the
sector of employment is to some extent an endogen-
ous characteristic since the choice of sector in which
to work is typically made after education is
completed.
12 In Table 3, we report the full set of estimates for the regression with firm factor effects.
13 The coefficient estimates for the gender dummy in this panel are identical to the statistical log earnings gaps.
14 For instance, men are more likely to have a temporary work contract (CDD) than women are as we move up along the
earnings distribution: 18.2% for both men and women in the first quartile against 2.5% for men and 4.5% for women in the
fourth quartile.
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In panel 5, we account for the firms’ computed
factors stemming from the factor analysis. In so
doing, our aim is to substitute a firm fixed-effect
regression by a ‘firm factor effect’ regression that may
account for qualitative aspects of firms’ wage policies,
human capital and organizational features. In a
sense, following Muller and Nordman (2004, 2006),
we generalize the approach developed in Cardoso
(1999) who regresses the firms’ fixed effects on
different variables. For our purpose, the first 10
computed factors concentrate most of the relevant
information about the firms’ characteristics. A Wald
test rejects at the 1% level the null hypothesis that the
coefficients of these 10 factors are jointly equal to
zero. Since the covariates introduced in the factor
analysis include the sectoral dummies, we omit these
explanatory variables in the earnings functions.
For the sake of comparison, we have also
performed a linear regression with firms’ fixed effects.
The female dummy coefficient in panel 3 (20.184) can
be compared with the one estimated at the mean with
the firm factor effect, which is equal to 20.177 (panel
5). So, the female coefficient is slightly reduced as we
move from sector fixed effects or firm fixed effects
models towards a firm factor effects specification. It
may be that the computed factors stemming from our
PCA of firms’ characteristics add a qualitative aspect
of the firms’ wage policy to our regressions that fixed
effects models, either with sector or firm dummies,
may not be able to totally control for.
According to the quantile estimates reported in
panel 5, we find that taking into account the firms’
factors slightly increases the gender dummy coeffi-
cient in absolute value at the lower tail of the
conditional log earnings distribution (from the 5th to
the median percentile). Conversely, the coefficient is
significantly reduced at the upper tail of the distribu-
tion, especially above the 75th percentile. Now, the
gender earnings gap amounts to about 27% at the
95th percentile while it amounted to more than 30%
with the extended and sectoral control variables.
With respect to the existing literature, our results
show that controlling for firms’ characteristics is
likely to have a reducing effect on the extent of the
glass ceiling phenomenon, albeit moderately.15
It is of interest to compare the magnitude of the
gender wage gap obtained respectively with inclusion
of firms’ factors (derived from the PCA) and firms’
characteristics. If we find that the various estimates
lead to very similar results, this would be the sign that
the PCA method may be useful to account for the
firm’s environment with a minimum number of
factors, thereby avoiding potential problems of
multicollinearity when multiple firm-specific vari-
ables are controlled for in wage regressions. Indeed,
by definition, the main components derived from the
factor analysis are poorly correlated and also have
the advantage to sum up the main statistical
information of the firm level variables.
According to the different estimates described in
Table 2, we observe that the results from these two
specifications are very similar. On the one hand, the
coefficients associated with the gender dummy are
increasing (in absolute value) along the conditional
earnings distribution, especially at the 75th percentile
and above. On the other hand, once observed firms’
characteristics are controlled for, we note that the
magnitude of the coefficient on the gender variable is
slightly lower with respect to the regression with
firms’ factors. At the top of the distribution, the
gender earnings gap is equal to 24.9% with firms’
characteristics, 27.1% with firms’ factors, while it
amounts to 30.4% with extended controls and
sectoral dummies.
Finally, panels 6 and 7 of Table 2 present the
quantile log earnings regression estimates adding 29
occupational dummies. We present these estimates
separately because there is no clear consensus as to
whether occupation (and to some extent industry)
should be taken into account to assess the extent of
the gender wage gap. If employers differentiate
between men and women through their tendency to
hire into certain occupations, then occupational
assignment is an outcome of employer practices
rather than an outcome of individual choice or
productivity differences.16 While panel 6 presents
the gender dummy coefficient of a sector fixed effect
model, panel 7 accounts for the coefficients of a firm
factor effect model. Again, both sets of estimates are
very close.
As might be expected, controlling for occupation
considerably reduces the gender gap throughout the
conditional earnings distribution. In panel 7, the
unexplained gender gap falls to 8.8% at the 5th
percentile and, more importantly, to 22% at the 95th
percentile (compared to 9.4% and 31.7% in panel 5).
We would argue that the effect of controlling for
occupation on the gender earnings gap reflects the
15Note that this result is not sensitive to the number of included firms’ factors in the earnings functions. In fact, adding more
factors (up to a total of 20) does not change significantly the estimated coefficients on the gender dummy at each considered
quantile of the earnings distribution.
16 Conversely, one can argue that analyses that omit occupation and industry may overlook the importance of background
and choice-based characteristics on wage outcomes, while analyses that fully control for these variables may undervalue the
significance of labour market constraints on wage outcomes (Altonji and Blank, 1999).
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occupational segregation that may be present in
France. However, we also note that if the gender
earnings gap varies significantly at the upper tail of
the conditional earnings distribution from panel 1 to
panel 7, it remains remarkably stable at the bottom
5th or 10th percentiles.
Quantile regressions by gender
In the previous section, we have estimated the
magnitude of the gender earnings gap conditional
on the characteristics of the pooled sample of male
and female workers at different points of the earnings
distribution, thereby implicitly assuming that the
returns to those characteristics were the same at
various quantiles for men and women. However, this
assumption seems a priori unrealistic. We now test its
relevance by introducing into the earnings functions a
set of the same covariates crossed with the gender
dummy. Estimates of these quantile regressions are
shown in Table 4, which can be compared to pooled
estimates in Table 3.
We use a Wald test to assess the joint significa-
tiveness of the crossed variables all along the
conditional earnings distribution. The values of the
statistics at each considered percentile reveal that we
have to reject the hypothesis of joint nullity of the
crossed variables at the 1% level. This rejection of the
pooling assumption therefore implies that gender
specific equations (i.e. for men and for women) have
to be estimated instead. More specifically, Table 4 is
indicative of which return of the introduced labour
market characteristics significantly differs across
genders at each considered quantile.
We notice that almost all returns vary across the
sexes whatever the workers’ relative position in the
conditional distribution. This is all the more true for
the returns to human capital, i.e. schooling and
experience, which are always significantly lower for
women. The only exception is for the return to tenure
at the midpoint of the distribution (50th percentile).
Interestingly, some demographic characteristics, such
as the number of dependent children or a dummy for
being widowed (the reference is being married), have
differentiated impacts between men and women
depending on their relative position in the earnings
distribution. For instance, while the wage premium
for the number of children is not significantly
different between men and women in the lower tail
of the conditional distribution (percentiles 5th to
50th), this premium differs increasingly across gender
as we move up in the distribution.
Differentiated regressions by gender are then
displayed in Table 5. Let us briefly describe the
influence of a few explanatory variables. As pre-
viously noticed, the returns to human capital are
always lower for women. For instance, the return to
schooling increases, respectively for men and women,
from 4.2% vs. 3.3% at the 5th percentile to 13.4% vs.
12.5% at the 95th percentile. Also, while the marginal
return to potential experience off the current job is
decreasing for both genders (the quadratic term is
negative), it diminishes more rapidly for males than
for females. Other results are worth noting. First,
being divorced is detrimental to men, but not to
women. Second, the wage premium for working in
the Paris area is higher for men in the lower tail of the
distribution but, then, in the upper tail, the reverse is
true: women have certainly access to better jobs there.
These results provide therefore incentives to perform
earnings decompositions at quantiles instead of only
looking at decompositions at the sample mean.
Quantile decomposition
After having analysed the extent to which returns to
exogenous factors differ between men and women, we
now perform a quantile decomposition of the gender
gap. As in Albrecht et al. (2003) and following the
recent approach described in Machado and Mata
(2005), we decompose the difference between the male
and female log earnings distributions into two
components.17 The first one is due to differences in
labour market characteristics between male and
female employees. The second one is due to
differences in the rewards that both men and
women receive for their (observable) characteristics.
Instead of relying on the Oaxaca-Blinder decom-
position technique whose purpose is to identify the
sources of differences between the means of two
distributions, we implement the decomposition at
each quantile of the earnings distribution. Let us
briefly describe the approach developed by Machado
and Mata (2005). For the presentation, let m and f
denote respectively men and women’s returns to
labour market characteristics xm and xf respectively.
The decomposition of the difference between the male
and female earnings densities is:
xmmðÞxf fðÞ¼ ðxmxfÞfðÞþxmðmðÞfðÞÞ
ð2Þ
In the above equation, the first term on the right-
hand side indicates the magnitude of the gap which is
due to dissimilarities in labour market characteristics.
The second term indicates the magnitude of the gap
17 For further discussion on decomposition methods and the gender wage gap, see Silber and Weber (1999).
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which is due to differences in the rewards to these
characteristics. As two counterfactual densities may
be constructed, we choose to generate the density that
would arise if women were endowed on the basis of
men’s labour market characteristics and paid like
women.
To construct the counterfactual density, we rely on
the three following steps. First, we draw a sample of
150 numbers from a standard uniform distribution.
Second, using these different numbers j
(j¼ 1, . . . , 150), we estimate the quantile regressions
coefficient vectors fðjÞ for the various j using the
female subsample. Third, for each value of j, we take a
draw with replacement from the male data set and
generate the predicted wage xmfðjÞ. Two additional
comments are in order. First, in order to get SEs for
the counterfactual density, we have replicated the
whole procedure exactly 40 times. Second, as the
procedure is excessively time-consuming with very
large samples, we perform the quantile decomposition
on the basis of a random sample of 34 303 employees
(i.e. the sample rate is 1 employee out of 4).
When applying the quantile decomposition, we
again wonder whether the inclusion of firms’ factors
or characteristics may affect the underlying conclu-
sions. Specifically, we provide the decomposition
results for three specifications, i.e. with no firms
variables, with firms’ factors, and with firms’
characteristics. Results from the decompositions are
given in Table 6.
In the first, third and fifth columns, we report the
observed gender gaps at respectively the 10th, 25th,
50th, 75th and 90th percentile of the distribution for
the various specifications. The gender gaps reported
in columns 2, 4 and 6 are constructed using women’s
returns only, and then assuming that these women
have the male distribution of labour market char-
acteristics. In any cases, we observe that the gender
gap strongly increases throughout the earnings
distribution. Interestingly, the gap due to differences
in the returns to observable characteristics is of very
similar magnitude independently on the inclusion of
firm factors or firm characteristics.
Our results are in fact very similar to those
obtained in Sweden by Albrecht et al. (2003). We
clearly observe that gender differences in labour
market characteristics do not really explain the larger
gap observed at the top of the distribution. Instead,
the gender gap is mainly due to the differential
rewards that women receive for their own character-
istics. It is clear from the results of Table 6 that
women would receive much lower wages were they
paid as women while being endowed with male
characteristics. Hence, in France, our main finding
is that the glass ceiling effect is mainly due to
differences in returns to observed labour market
characteristics across genders at the top of the
distribution rather than to differences in those
characteristics.
V. Discussion and Concluding Comments
In this article, we have brought empirical evidence on
the glass ceiling effect according to which the gender
wage gap is more important at the upper tail of the
wage distribution. While several studies have recently
shed light on this phenomenon in European countries
(Albrecht et al., 2003; De la Rica et al., 2005;
Arulampalam et al., 2004), our contribution is the
first one to account for both characteristics of
employers and employees. It is only recently that
researchers have acknowledged that the use of
matched employer–employee data for studying
labour market discrimination can deepen the under-
standing of sex segregation in the professional
environment (Hellerstein and Neumark, 2005).
Interestingly, while the role of the firm characteristics
has been neglected so far in studies dealing with the
Table 6. Quantile decomposition and counterfactual gender gap
Distribution
With no firm controls With firms’ factors With firms’ characteristics
Observed Counterfactual Observed Counterfactual Observed Counterfactual
10th percentile 0.098 0.102 (0.022) 0.100 0.113 (0.015) 0.095 0.105 (0.014)
25th percentile 0.122 0.129 (0.018) 0.123 0.137 (0.005) 0.118 0.124 (0.005)
50th percentile 0.151 0.168 (0.023) 0.149 0.158 (0.009) 0.146 0.159 (0.019)
75th percentile 0.205 0.224 (0.023) 0.197 0.215 (0.019) 0.185 0.196 (0.014)
90th percentile 0.256 0.291 (0.035) 0.243 0.233 (0.010) 0.230 0.233 (0.013)
Source: Survey INSEE ECMOSS 1992.
Notes: Counterfactuals are constructed using the characteristics of male employees and returns to these characteristics of
female employees. Standard errors in parentheses are obtained with 40 replications of the decomposition. The decomposition
is performed using a random sample of 34 303 employees.
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gender gap, we believe that the work environment is
likely to affect the magnitude of the gender wage gap
along the earnings distribution.
Specifically, we assess the relevance of the glass
ceiling hypothesis using the French 1992 ECMOSS
data, which provides rich information on about
1 30 000 employees and 14 000 employers.
Econometric results from quantile regressions show
that there exists a significant glass ceiling effect in
France. While male and female earnings are close at
the bottom of the income distribution, there is a
strong increase in the gender earnings gap above the
75th percentile of this distribution. In order to control
for the firms’ characteristics, we follow Muller and
Nordman (2004, 2006) and rely on a principal
component analysis to extract the most influential
factors of the surveyed establishments. This approach
allows accounting for qualitative aspects of the firms
including their implemented wage policy, which may
not be the case when one controls for unobserved
heterogeneity through firm fixed effect models.
According to the French data, the gender earnings
gap would be overstated at the top of the distribution
if the influence of firms’ characteristics were omitted.
Hence, accounting for job-related characteristics as
well as for characteristics of the workers’ environ-
ment has a reducing effect on the extent of the glass
ceiling phenomenon. The reduction of the observed
gender wage gap once firm characteristics are
controlled for may be understood in a context of
sorting among firms, where productive firms primar-
ily form relationships with productive workers. In
this setting, the gender wage gap may arise as a result
of sorting of male and female workers across firms
that pay different wages. If this hypothesis is true,
accounting for the firm characteristics should reduce
the magnitude of the gender wage gap, if not clear it
up totally. In other words, the gender gap may be
nonexistent within firms if the gender pay gap is only
linked to sorting. However, this does not provide any
convincing argument as for the persistence of larger
wage gaps at the upper tail of the wage distribution.
Other forces that would rationalize the existence of
the glass ceiling effect may also be at work. Despite of
the reduction in the earnings gap for the most paid
workers, there is still a large and significant difference
between the male and female earnings. Furthermore,
our counterfactual decomposition shows that the
glass ceiling effect is mostly due to differences in the
returns to labour market characteristics across
genders at the top of the distribution rather than to
average differences in these characteristics. Hence,
our results are very similar to those reported in recent
studies conducted in Europe. As there is now robust
evidence on the magnitude of the glass ceiling effect in
industrialized countries, it would be worthwhile to
deepen the understanding of the origins and causes of
this stylized fact. We leave this issue for future
research.
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Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of the firms’ characteristics
Variables Mean SD Min Max
Firms’ manpower structure
Share of production blue collar workers in the firm (A41) 0.593 0.27 0.01 1
Share of nonproduction blue collar workers in the firm (A42) 0.454 0.32 0.00 1
Share of technicians and supervisors in the firm (A43) 0.320 0.19 0.01 1
Share of executives in the firm (A44) 0.133 0.16 0.00 1
Sectoral dummies
Food and agriculture (S1) 0.028 0.166 0 1
Production and distribution of energy (S2) 0.011 0.105 0 1
Intermediary goods (S3) 0.054 0.225 0 1
Equipment goods (S4) 0.055 0.227 0 1
Current consumption goods (S5) 0.065 0.246 0 1
Construction (S6) 0.073 0.261 0 1
Trade (S7) 0.173 0.379 0 1
Transports and telecommunications (S8) 0.082 0.274 0 1
Tradable services (S9) 0.398 0.489 0 1
Real-estate services (S10) 0.009 0.092 0 1
Insurances (S11) 0.020 0.138 0 1
Financial organizations (S12) 0.033 0.180 0 1
(continued)
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Table A1. Continued
Variables Mean SD Min Max
Firm size
Total number of employees in the firm (A4) 373.688 1008.66 1.00 22 174
Less than 20 employees (T1) 0.313 0.464 0 1
20–49 employees (T2) 0.341 0.474 0 1
50–99 employees (T3) 0.153 0.360 0 1
100–199 employees (T4) 0.066 0.248 0 1
200–499 employees (T5) 0.063 0.243 0 1
More than 500 employees (T6) 0.065 0.246 0 1
Declared average number of paid hours of training per worker
and per year in the establishment (dummies)
Zero hour or no hours declared (FF1) 0.498 0.500 0 1
1–10 h (FF2) 0.216 0.411 0 1
11–40 h (FF3) 0.203 0.402 0 1
More than 40 h (FF4) 0.060 0.237 0 1
Firms’ general and organisational characteristics
State of business: strongly growing or growing (VA1) 0.440 0.496 0 1
State of business: stable (VA2) 0.293 0.455 0 1
State of business: strongly decreasing or decreasing (VA3) 0.210 0.407 0 1
Activity is usually affected by seasonal movements (D21) 0.360 0.480 0 1
Activity is rather regular (D31) 2.448 2.225 1 9
Activity is rather irregular (D32) 1.934 3.463 0 9
Firm has been affected by unusual Shocks in 1992 (D4A1) 0.333 0.471 0 1
Downward shock in 1992 (D4B1) 0.038 0.190 0 1
Upward shock in 1992 (D4B2) 0.308 0.462 0 1
Presence of union representatives in the firm (PS1) 0.252 0.434 0 1
Existence of wage negotiations in 1992 (D151) 0.225 0.418 0 1
Existence of a formal wage scale system for blue collar
workers (D19A1)
0.769 0.421 0 1
Based on the branch’s collective agreement (D19B1) 0.614 0.487 0 1
Based on the firm’s collective agreement (D19B2) 0.099 0.299 0 1
Based on another evaluation scheme (D19B3) 0.065 0.246 0 1
Number of intermediate levels of management between the
firm’s manager and blue collar workers:
Zero (D250) 0.222 0.416 0 1
From 1 to 4 (D251) 0.673 0.469 0 1
From 5 to 10 (D252) 0.035 0.185 0 1
From 11 and above (D253) 0.000 0.022 0 1
Existence of job rotation schemes:
Put into practice within production teams (D26A1) 2.258 1.738 1 9
Intended to some versatile workers only (D26B1) 0.284 0.451 0 1
Direct collaborations between employees encouraged (D281) 0.499 0.500 0 1
Achieved work is ‘permanently’ controlled (D301) 0.618 0.486 0 1
Individual performances are ‘systematically’ controlled
(D311)
0.361 0.480 0 1
Existence of a formal system to measure individual
performances (D321)
0.209 0.406 0 1
Base wage progressions ‘exclusively’ depend on individual
increases (D331)
0.057 0.232 0 1
Base wage progressions ‘principally’ depend on individual
increases (D332)
0.148 0.356 0 1
Base wage progressions ‘little’ depend on individual
increases (D333)
0.260 0.439 0 1
Base wage progressions ‘never’ depend on individual
increases (D334)
0.256 0.436 0 1
Base wage progressions ‘exclusively’ depend on general
increases (D341)
0.235 0.424 0 1
Base wage progressions ‘principally’ depend on general
increases (D342)
0.381 0.486 0 1
(continued)
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Table A1. Continued
Variables Mean SD Min Max
Base wage progressions ‘little’ depend on general increases
(D343)
0.125 0.331 0 1
Base wage progressions ‘never’ depend on general increases
(D344)
0.145 0.352 0 1
Importance accorded by employers to the following criteria
in individual wage increases:
Workers’ tenure in the job (D3513) 0.064 0.244 0 1
Increase in workers’ performance (D3523) 0.359 0.480 0 1
Workers’ training effort (D3533) 0.087 0.282 0 1
Accumulation of experience (D3543) 0.166 0.372 0 1
Acquisition of versatility (D3553) 0.157 0.364 0 1
Increase in workers’ responsibilities (D3563) 0.321 0.467 0 1
Intra-firm mobility (D3573) 0.097 0.296 0 1
Difficulty of workers’ eventual replacement (D3583) 0.063 0.244 0 1
Firm gives relative bonuses (the best workers are awarded)
(D3911)
0.403 0.491 0 1
Firm gives absolute bonuses (production standards are
exceeded) (D3921)
0.158 0.365 0 1
Firm favours relative bonuses (D39B1) 0.076 0.264 0 1
Firm has an explicit wage policy characterized by precise
objectives (D411)
0.206 0.405 0 1
Source: Survey INSEE ECMOSS 1992.
Note: The number of establishments is 14 693.
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